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1Abstract
 This study aims to reconsider the relationship between essentialism and the other 
by focusing on the role of imagination in essentialism. Traditionally, imagination has 
served the essentialist doctrine in that essentialism requires the unification of multiplicity 
into category and the imagination of other aspects not given to consciousness of the self. 
However, by encountering the other as transcendence or the subaltern, the imaginative 
faculty encounters setbacks. This occurs because this direction of imagination ?from 
the self to the other? may be regarded as a form of dogmatism, Euro-centrism, and 
egocentrism as Emmanuel Levinas and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak suggest. In this 
regard, essentialism seems to be collapsed in parallel. Despite the existence of the subaltern, 
Spivak seeks the potentiality of essentialism and finds that only the ?strategic? use of it 
by the weak in society can be justified to counteract the international division of labor. 
In this study, referring to the discussion of Spivak, I part ways with strategic essentialism 
in terms of the necessity of the universal justification of conceptions such as freedom, 
equality, human rights, and social justice. I claim that imagination directed towards the self, 
in other words, ?Imagine thyself? provides the sense of risk, the function of self-critique 
into essentialism. In other words, essentialism must be modified so that it opens itself 
to continual reassessment by the other. The gameness of essentialism oriented to create 
the intersubjective confirmation should be defended to be responsible for the voiceless in 
society.
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1．Introduction
 There are two kinds of essentialism. One is dogmatic essentialism, 
which regards essences as the substantial entities that exist objectively beyond 
this phenomenal world ?such as the Platonic theory of forms?. The other 
is intersubjective essentialism, which requires intersubjective reassessment 
and confirmation to validate the universality of essences ?such as Husserlian 
phenomenological essentialism?.? This study mainly deals with the latter kind.
 In intersubjective essentialism, the question is whether what is identical 
to the object grasped by the self can also be validated by the other. If the other 
refuses the proposal, then the essence does not reach universality and merely 
stands on subjective or communal belief. Thus, the self needs to examine and 
refine the ways in which to express the essential structures and conditions 
in the process of insight. In other words, the self must critically imagine 
the different conditions and aspects in which the other exists as if ?I? were 
there. In this regard, imagination is closely connected to the establishment of 
intersubjective essentialism.
 However, with the emergence of the other as transcendence in 
Emmanuel Levinas? sense, essentialism must be modified, somehow, because 
the imaginative faculty directed toward the other no longer works adequately. 
Merely imagining the conditions of the other from the first-person perspective 
becomes inadequate for obtaining intersubjectively validated essences. This is 
because imagination of the self cannot reach the lived experiences of the other. 
Rather, it may be regarded as a form of arrogance that intellectuals blindly 
hold on to because the self unilaterally internalizes alterity in this case. 
 Thus, it can be argued that the existence of the transcendent other 
creates a significant challenge for essentialism. It concerns whether the self can 
obtain the universal validity of the essence beyond socio-cultural differences 
and without the use of oppressive mechanisms. Is it possible for essentialism 
to accommodate plural opinions and conciliation of belief through conflict 
in itself? Or, is essentialism to be seen as already outdated as a part of the 
heritage of Western egocentrism? 
 In this study, I make an attempt to defend the potentiality of 
essentialism in terms of two vectors of imagination. Taking not only 
imagination directed toward the other but also imagination directed toward 
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the self into consideration, essentialism learns the sense of risk, i.e., the ability 
to self-critique, which provides tension to essentialism. However, this does 
not mean that essentialism should be applied to every field of study. It is 
important to determine the realm in which essentialist thought is required 
and the aim for which it is employed. In other words, essentialism is to be 
employed in correlation to a specific aim. I cannot discuss the comprehensive 
clarification of the aim of essentialism in this study; however, I do claim that 
the dimension of essences is still called for?at least in order to support the 
voiceless or the subaltern in society. 
 I first review the role of imagination in essentialism. Imagination can 
be defined as the ability to unify the multiple sensory data or individual ones 
into categories and examine the validity of the unified category obtained in 
the subjective consciousness. Second, the other as transcendence that appears 
in the dimension of infinity is described, with reference to Levinas? Totality 
and Inf inity. For Levinas, the other cannot be internalized into the self, 
and consequently, the schema of the Western deserves criticism. Third, the 
relationship between the subaltern and the strategic essentialism of Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak is clarified. For Spivak, the use of ?strategic? essentialism 
can still be justified to mobilize the subaltern even though ?theoretical? 
essentialism, which may label the subaltern as fixedly being identified, should 
be abandoned. Finally, I attempt to lay out the potentiality of essentialism in a 
way that is different than Spivak?s. Essentialism is equipped with the function 
of self-critique, which is to say that it bears the sense of risk, by means of 
bringing imagination toward the self into essentialism. 
2．The Role of Imagination in Essentialism
 In general, essentialism is defined as ?a metaphysical theory that 
objects have essences and that there is a distinction between essential and 
non-essential or accidental predications.?? That is, essentialism claims that 
an essence must exist for determining the identity of something, which is 
characterized as a necessary and universal property that is common among 
individuals in comparison with accidental properties. As I mentioned, 
dogmatic essentialism and intersubjective essentialism are discriminate in 
that the former presupposes the essence as a substantial entity, while the 
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latter always requires assessment by the other to confirm the validity of the 
essence. Insofar as an essentialist theory attempts to avoid falling into a naïve 
and dogmatic way of thinking, essentialism always requires the intersubjective 
dimension in which the self assesses the validity of essences through imagining 
the situations, feelings, and thoughts of the other. Alternatively, in the field of 
modal logic, an investigator must expand the field of consideration to other 
possible worlds to which only imagination is able to reach. Thus, it can be 
argued that imagination and essentialism cannot be separated because essences 
in the sense of intersubjective confirmation always exist in combination with 
imagining different aspects lived by the other.
 However, imagination has been subordinated to the power of 
intelligence in the history of modern philosophy. For instance, René Descartes 
maintained that ?bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses 
nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone.?? For Descartes, 
neither sense nor imagination could serve in the role of mediation between 
cognition and the world, i.e., subject and object, while intellect alone had 
the quality of explicating the nature of the world. The trust placed in human 
reason underpins the confidence in disciplinary knowledge from the beginning 
of modernity, with sensation and imagination thought to be dependent on 
intelligence.
 It was in the eighteenth century that two philosophers?Adam Smith 
and Immanuel Kant?presented the unique dimensions of imagination, 
which had been unnoticed by modern philosophers for a long time? even 
though these two philosophers focused on different aspects of it. Whereas 
Smith thematized the specific role of imagination in terms of empathy for 
the other,? Kant schematized a priori cognitive structures such as sensation, 
understanding, and reason, with imagination determined as mediation that 
synthesized sensory data ?given through sensation? into the category of 
understanding.
 To begin with, according to Smith, ?as we have no immediate experience 
of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are 
affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. 
[...]. By imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves 
enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become 
in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his 
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sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not 
altogether unlike them.?? What is important here is the fact that imagination 
of the self is directed toward the other, and conceiving what we ourselves 
should feel in a similar situation is enabled by the symmetric stability of the 
relationship between the self and the other, such that the other is regarded 
as a variation of the self. Therefore, for Smith, ?every faculty in one man is 
the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your 
sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your 
resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can 
have, any other way of judging about them.?? 
 Kant stipulates the role of imagination on epistemological concern. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, he claims that ?yet the figurative synthesis, 
if it pertains merely to the original synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., this 
transcendental unity, which is thought in the categories, must be called, as 
distinct from the merely intellectual combination, the transcendental synthesis 
of the imagination. Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even 
without its presence in intuition. Now, since all of our intuition is sensible, the 
imagination, on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can 
give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs to 
sensibility; but insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which 
is determining and not, like sense, merely determinable, [...] its synthesis of 
intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis 
of the imagination.?? The transcendental synthesis of imagination must be 
an a priori structure embedded in human cognition as well as sensation, 
understanding, and reason so that it is called the ?productive imagination? and 
distinguished from ?the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject 
solely to empirical laws, namely, those of association, and which, therefore, 
contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition a 
priori and, on account of that, belongs not in transcendental philosophy but 
in psychology.?? Through productive imagination, discrete sensory data is 
synthesized into a united meaning and classified on the basis of the categories 
of understanding that clarify what an entity is. It is Kant who attentively 
connects imagination to the category of understanding for the first time in the 
history of Western philosophy. After Smith and Kant, imagination has often 
played a functional role in the attainment of universal essences or the creation 
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of an imagined unity.
 For instance, Edmund Husserl explicitly employs imaginative variation 
in the establishment of phenomenological essentialism. Compared with 
the scientific investigator, who seeks factual truths based on experience, for 
the investigator of the essence, only phantasy provides ?the ability to run 
through freely and on all sides the endless manifolds of possibilities, here of 
possibilities of lived-process ?to see universalities according to eidetic law, to 
attack problems like those of the constitution of real things in general?.??? The 
phenomenological method of grasping the essential structures and conditions 
of the object is called eidetic seeing, which is ?based on the modification of 
an experienced or imagined objectivity, turning it into an arbitrary example, 
which, simultaneously, receives the character of a guiding ?model,? a point of 
departure for the production of an infinite multiplicity of variants. It is based, 
therefore, on a variation.??? Here, it is clear that Husserl attentively makes use 
of imagination ?that is, imaginative variation? to clarify and attain what is 
identical to the object.
 Furthermore, Saul Kripke employs the power of imagination in order 
to review possible worlds and determine a rigid designator. A rigid designator 
?e.g., names or statements representing scientific discoveries? designates the 
same object in every possible world regardless of whether the object exists 
in all possible worlds.?? That is, ?when we think of a property as essential to 
an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it 
would have existed.??? For instance, in the case of gold, its atomic number 
???? can be regarded as its rigid designator, and ?any world in which we 
imagine a substance which does not have these properties is a world in which 
we imagine a substance which is not gold, provided these properties form 
the basis of what the substance is.??? Indeed, the question has remained 
unanswered as to whether or not Kripke?s essentialism blindly reposes trust 
in the achievements of the natural sciences having been validated. However, 
we can at least figure out that imagination plays a significant role in inquiring 
into common properties in every possible world.
 Moreover, as is well known, Benedict Anderson indicates that the nation 
is ?an imagined political community–and imagined as both inherently limited 
and sovereign? because ?the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet 
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in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.??? Here, it can be 
argued that imagination contributes to the integration and union of unknown 
others. In other words, imagination brings forth a category in which the self 
and the other are yoked together, and the stability between them engages 
in the construction of a totality. After all, according to Anderson, imagined 
community without any specific ground has caused people to kill each other 
or to willingly die over the past two centuries.?? 
 In short, the main function of imagination in terms of essentialism can 
be defined as unifying multiple sensory data or individuals into categories and 
assessing the validity of the subjective category by imagining the different 
conditions and aspects of the other. It should be noted that the potentiality 
of essentialism depends on its capability of imagining common structures 
and conditions inter-subjectively validated among others. Furthermore, the 
discourse of essentialism is underpinned by an assumption, namely, that the 
other is a variant of the self. This does not mean, however, that essentialism 
claims that there is no difference between the self and the other but rather 
that the self can know the difference ?or commonality through actualizing 
differences? between them through firing up the imagination. Of course, 
an essentialist has the right to determine what something is without the 
dimension of imagining the other; however, in this case, obtained essences 
would fall into unverifiable dogmatism, leading to possible other world 
views trusted by the other being ignored. Therefore, I come to the tentative 
conclusion that imagination is an act of integration that provides for categories 
and the essence, allowing the self and the other to hold a stable symmetric 
relationship.
3．The Other as Transcendence
 While the relationship between the self and the other holds symmetric 
stability, it is still possible for the self to know the situation of the other by 
imagining it ?as if I were there.? However, this one-sidedly constituting 
procedure of thinking is stigmatized as cogito-centrism, and consequently, the 
basis of essentialism, the symmetric stability between the self and the other, 
collapses via the emergence of the other as transcendence. In this section, 
I briefly review how Levinas criticizes the entirety of Western philosophy, 
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which has always been a philosophy of the same.
 According to Levinas, war as the ultimate form of violence encompasses 
all beings within a totality, and no one can create distance from the 
totalization of war; ?the visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the 
concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy.??? While totality 
does not permit the existence of outside-ness so that there is no room for 
echt transcendence, infinity as non-encompassable within a totality expresses 
transcendence in the discourse of metaphysics, and ?what remains ever exterior 
to thought is thought in the idea of infinity.??? Simply stated, the tradition 
of Western philosophy has always remained the philosophy of the same 
and has contributed to the formation of a totality and, consequently, has no 
means to counteract the outrage of violence. The dominance of ontology over 
metaphysics betrays the inability of Western philosophy, for the egocentricity 
of ontology spoils the ethical relationship with the other.
 For instance, Martin Heidegger claims that ?all ontology, no matter 
how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, 
remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first 
adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as 
its fundamental task.??? The question as to the meaning of being forms the 
central theme of Being and Time, preceding any tangible ontological question 
and explication as ?in the question which we are to work out, what is asked 
about is Being?that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis 
of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in 
detail.??? In other words, being itself should be distinguished from any entities 
that ?are? in the world. This is why Levinas maintains that Heideggerian 
ontology subordinates ?the relationship with the Other to the relation with 
Being in general.??? Apparently, it becomes absurd or even abusive for Levinas 
that ?Dasein?s resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let 
the Others who are with it ?be? in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and 
co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates.??? 
In contrast to Heidegger, Levinas contends that a metaphysics in which ?desire 
tends toward something else entirely, toward the absolutely other??? should 
precede ontology because ?ontology, which reduces the other to the same, 
promotes freedom?the freedom that is the identification of the same, not 
allowing itself to be alienated by the other.??? Ontology should be explicated 
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in terms of the metaphysical relationship with the other as a matter of 
priority; in other words, the meaning of being should be interpreted in terms 
of an ethical perspective, while the converse does not hold true. Therefore, 
Levinas concludes that ontology as the first philosophy may be defined as ?a 
philosophy of power,? and ?a philosophy of injustice,??? only to serve under 
the logic of totality.
 Furthermore, the Husserlian transcendental enterprise remains a sort 
of philosophy of the same in terms of Levinas? metaphysical perspective. 
Husserl employs the well-known method known as the ?phenomenological 
reduction? in order to disclose the realm of transcendental subjectivity. In 
the phenomenological ?transcendental? attitude, all positing of being should 
be entirely suspended or parenthesized with the operation of ?epoché,? with 
transcendental subjectivity being regarded as the only place where every being 
in the world, including entity, conception, and idea, is constituted. According 
to Husserl, ?the epoché can also be said to be the radical and universal method 
by which I apprehend myself purely [...]. The world is for me absolutely 
nothing else but the world existing for and accepted by me in such a conscious 
cogito.??? Naturally, in Husserlian phenomenology, the other is thought to be 
constituted in transcendental subjectivity; the transcendental ego constitutes 
the other in the mode of alter ego.?? In this way, the other ?is therefore 
conceivable only as an analogue of something included in my peculiar 
ownness.??? Thus, it is not difficult to determine the symmetric relationship 
between the self and the other in Husserlian phenomenology; this is why 
Levinas says that ?the metaphysical relation can not be properly speaking 
a representation, for the other would therein dissolve into the same: every 
representation is essentially interpretable as a transcendental constitution.??? 
Levinas is clearly opposed to the discourse of the symmetrized philosophy of 
the same in Husserl, for ?the metaphysical other is other with an alterity that 
is not formal, is not the simple reverse of identity, and is not formed out of 
resistance to the same, but is prior to every initiative, to all imperialism of the 
same.??? For Levinas, the ?Other? as the wholly other must be the ?Stranger? 
over whom one has no power.?? 
 In the dimension of infinity, the relationship between the self and the 
other apparently becomes asymmetric and disproportional, for the other as 
unambiguously undeterminable is always going forth from the understanding 
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of the self. Levinas claims that ?the metaphysician and the other do not 
constitute a simple correlation, which would be reversible. The reversibility of 
a relation where the terms are indifferently read from left to right and from 
right to left would couple them the one to the other; they would complete 
one another in a system visible from the outside. [...]. the radical separation 
between the same and the other means precisely that it is impossible to place 
oneself outside of the correlation between the same and the other so as to 
record the correspondence or the non-correspondence of this going with this 
return.??? The other as transcendence lays out the limitations of empathy 
and the understanding of the self towards alterity. Here, the self cannot 
objectively condescend to the situation of the other because the other is no 
longer a variant of the self; it is the endless movement always going beyond 
the intentional power of the self; the asymmetric relationship between them 
is ?irreducible to the distance the synthetic activity of the understanding 
establishes between the diverse terms.??? Thus, it should be said that the 
emergence of the other as transcendence comes to disclose a clear limit of 
essentialism in that imagination becomes unable to reach out to the other and 
the other seems to exist beyond the imagination and understanding of the self. 
In this case, the self is not sure how the other thinks, feels, and experiences the 
world. 
4．The Subaltern and Strategic Essentialism
 There is no doubt that postmodern thought in Europe has presented the 
antithesis of the whole of modernity through reflection on the consequences 
of modernity, i.e., WWI and WWII and the outrage of Nazism and Stalinism. 
The fact that intellectuals in Europe could not find a way to countervail 
irrational violence presses for a fundamental paradigm change in the fields 
of philosophy and thought. For instance, Michel Foucault presents strong 
opposition to the epistemological model of modern philosophy shared from 
Descartes to Husserl, i.e., ?the model of knowledge and the primacy of the 
subject.? This is because knowledge is always already mediated by a certain 
power network, and the forms and possible domains of knowledge have been 
determined by complicated and floating power relations.?? Thus, for Foucault, 
there can be no isolated transcendental subject working as the evident starting 
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point in modern philosophy. In the context of the critique of power and, in 
particular, the critique of political power, it can be said that Foucault stands on 
the side of social minorities and protects them from invisible oppression. This 
is to say that he turns his regard to the other in society ?i.e., prisoners and 
sexual minorities? who have been ignored and exist outside of the political 
language game.
 In this regard, Spivak?s critique of Foucault and Gilles Deleuze is 
surprising because the existence of the subaltern uncovered by Spivak seems to 
be analogous to socio-cultural minorities on the surface. However, Spivak sees 
a sort of arrogance and blindness of European intellectuals in the narrative 
of Foucault and Deleuze. According to Spivak, the conversation between 
Foucault and Deleuze entitled ?Intellectuals and Power??? implies that 
?intellectuals must attempt to disclose and know the discourse of society?s 
Other. Yet the two systematically ignore the question of ideology and their 
own implication in intellectual and economic history.??? That is to say they 
ignore the fact that they themselves are inevitably involved in ideological 
discourse and are indeed blind to the system of the international division of 
labor?standing on the side of exploiters and using the logic of Europeans. 
They believe that they can be a neutral medium for the Third World?? by 
stating that ?the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent???; however, 
this transparency itself indeed should be called into question.?? The subaltern 
can neither be objectified nor subjectified by a one-sidedly determining gaze.
 Apparently, the subaltern is thought to be the asymmetric other as 
transcendence so that ?it is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals 
to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed 
subject of the Other.??? The conditions of the subaltern always overflow 
from the imagination and understanding of the self. An attempt to define 
unambiguously the heterogeneous other is inevitably thwarted as ?outside 
?through not completely so? the circuit of the international division of 
labor, there are people whose consciousness we cannot grasp if we close off 
our benevolence by constructing a homogeneous Other referring only to our 
own place in the seat of the Same and the Self. Here are subsistence farmers, 
unorganized peasant labor, the tribals, and the communities of zero workers on 
the street or in the countryside.??? In this sense, no one can be a representative 
or diaphanous mediate of the subaltern; rather the subaltern cannot speak at 
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all.?? 
 It is also worth noting that the heterogeneity of subalternity seems to 
be contradictory to the idea of essentialism, for essentialism determines what 
is identical among individuals. For instance, the statement ?women should be 
like women? apparently presupposes a substantial essence shared by all women 
and, in terms of feminism, includes the very discriminative sense that ignores 
the plurality and multiplicity of personality. In this case, essentialism becomes 
a sort of dogmatism discriminating and oppressing the weaker ?category? in 
society. 
 While Spivak is aware of the precariousness of essentialism, she 
attentively and strategically employs the idea of essentialism in order to 
counteract the fixed social system that is based on substantial conceptions such 
as gender, class, and race. This is called ?strategic essentialism.? Indeed, I have 
a different vantage point on essentialism from Spivak; however, I agree with 
her that essentialism cannot be easily abandoned but simultaneously requires 
a sort of modification in order to not function as an oppressive mechanism. I 
expand on this point in detail later. Here, let me briefly review how and why 
Spivak employs the idea of essentialism.
 To begin with, it is important that Spivak regards essentialism not 
as philosophical theory but as a strategic device to emancipate or mobilize 
socio-cultural minorities. Spivak writes: ?If one is considering strategy, one 
has to look at where the group?the person, the persons, or the movement?
is situated when one makes claims for or against essentialism. A strategy 
suits a situation; a strategy is not a theory.??? As Stephen Morton points out, 
?Spivak?s account of strategic essentialism is precisely an attempt to develop 
a more situated account of the agency of relatively disempowered social groups 
such as women, the colonized or the proletariat.??? In other words, it can be 
argued that Spivak bestows essentialism in correlation to the specific aim, i.e., 
on a tentative basis, always preparing to discard it. While Spivak claims that 
?we have to choose again strategically, not universal discourse but essentialist 
discourse,??? she clearly stands opposed to traditional essentialism with the 
fixed distinction between the essential and the accidental. The question is 
under what conditions strategic essentialism is required. In other words, why 
do we need essentialism? Tetsuya Motohashi picks up on three situation types 
that are appropriate for strategic essentialism.?? 
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 ?. Strategic essentialism can be used when ?women? talk about their 
gender or when people from India talk about India. The point here is the 
power relationship of discourse. That is, when men talk about ?women? or 
when the stronger or dominant group talks about ?India,? the discourse of 
essentialism is easily fixed and serves already existing power relationships. 
?. The aim of strategic essentialism is to defend adverse claims by the weak 
against discrimination based on human categories ?gender differences, 
ethnic groups, sexual orientation, culture, class, race, religion, age, and ability, 
among other things?. Through recognizing the essence ?conditions? of 
?the weak,? the oppressed in society can uncover a clue because the essence 
of the weak enables the unification of people who are suffering under the 
same circumstances. ?. The unification of subordinate groups provides the 
potentiality of solidarity open to the other. The self-essentialization of 
strategic essentialism enables the continual creation of the self through the 
sharing of the essence with the other. 
 As Motohashi observes, strategic essentialism plays a key role in 
preventing the isolation of the weak, for the essence necessarily reminds 
them of their connection with neighbors. Resisting the oppressive fixed social 
system, the new, modified essentialism is oriented to the establishment of a 
movement that is based on the unification of subordinate groups. Moreover, 
it is important to be aware that this is a temporal strategy. If essentialism 
begins to determine persons, groups, or communities in the irrational way, it 
should be deconstructed with thoroughness. Thus, the essentialism employed 
by Spivak provides a means for political movement of the social-cultural 
minorities to counteract traditional power mechanisms.
 In sum, Spivak does not think that the existence of the subaltern is 
incompatible with essentialism as a whole. To the extent that the use of 
essentialism is limited to being a strategy for the weak, it can efficiently 
become functional for the sake of counteracting the dominant political power of 
the majority. Therefore, for Spivak, the potentiality for essentialism arises from 
considering the specific conditions under which essentialism does not oppress 
given social categories such as gender, class, and race, such that discussion on 
essentialism is not decimated.
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5． Transformation of Imagination and Essentialism: 
Toward “Imagine Thyself”
 Imagination directed toward the other that helps obtain intersubjectively 
validated essences meets with a setback by encountering the other as 
transcendence ?i.e., the subalternity?. The existence of the subaltern nullifies 
the self?s attempt to imagine other conditions, such that the self cannot judge 
whether unified categories given to subjectivity can be confirmed by the other. 
The subaltern exists outside of the ?horizon? of the life-world. When the 
self is faced with the clear limitation of the imaginative faculty, the self itself 
is called into doubt because the other is no longer a variant of the self; the 
evidence of the self is called into question. Here, we can find another form of 
imagination: imagination directed towards the self. Namely, imagination issues 
forth from the self toward the other but rebounds on the self from the other. 
How might this be conducive to essentialism? How might essentialism be 
modified by this? 
 Levinas maintains that ?we think that existence for itself is not the 
ultimate meaning of knowing, but rather the putting back into question of 
the self, the turning back to what is prior to oneself, in the presence of the 
Other.??? Alternatively, Spivak claims that ?to confront them ?the subaltern? 
is not to represent ?vertreten? them but to learn to represent ?darstellen? 
ourselves.??? Both thinkers refer to the similar dimension that the logic of 
the self unavoidably encounters: ?Imagine thyself.? To certify what the self is 
constitutes the basis of modern philosophy, which is to say that the evidence 
of the cogito has provided the unquestioned starting point for philosophy as 
rigorous science. However, the emergence of the transcendent other breaks 
with this foundation and creates another form of imagination, i.e., imagination 
towards the self, which provides the ?sense of risk? to philosophy. That is, the 
self here can make a mistake or bruise the other?s feelings; thus, the essence 
works here in a dogmatic way or allows labeling someone as being substantially 
identified. Consequently, a certain tension arises in essentialism. As far as 
it seeks essential and universal structures, essentialism clings to overcoming 
relativity among persons, cultures, religions, and communities. However, 
essentialism always exposes itself to falling into oppressive dogmatism as far as 
it has a clear limitation with respect to imaginative capability. 
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 The thought based on the other as transcendence or the subaltern 
may involve refusing the idea of essentialism itself, which attempts to make 
a universal ?intersubjective? basis for the establishment of society. Even 
though Spivak employs ?strategic? essentialism to mobilize the subaltern, she 
apparently stands opposed to ?theoretical? essentialism. I agree with Spivak 
in the sense that essentialism is employed in correlation to the specific aim. 
However, in contrast to Spivak, I think essentialism should be theoretically 
defended in pursuance of universal justification in some specific regions and 
explicated by anyone who would like to take part in the universal language 
game regardless of whether the person belongs to a high or low social class in 
the international division of labor.
 It can be argued that assessing what realms require and deserve essential 
thinking itself constitutes a valuable challenge. For instance, the question of 
whether only the weakest in society should make use of essentialism must 
be reconsidered. More attention should be paid to the fact that only those 
who live in the First World can change the international labor system; more 
precisely, if ?we? do not make any effort to understand and imagine the 
situation of the subaltern, there is no way to change the system except grin 
and bear the countercharge the weak for the emergence of outrage ?such 
as terrorism and violent incidents?. The subaltern indeed has no means to 
counteract the international political system of power. Moreover, it is not 
possible to provide universal reasons why the weak in society are to be rescued 
in the logic of Spivak. That is, no evidence has been provided as to the reasons 
why the self must be responsible for the oppressed other in society. Therefore, 
it is apparent that strategic essentialism hardly comes into effect before the 
universal justification of concepts such as freedom, equality, social justice, and 
human rights, which should be shared among all human beings, are obtained 
in advance. In the case of ?women? or ?India,? the essence generated within 
the discourse of the strong reproduces the fixed discriminatory mechanism, 
which always operates in favor of the powerful. However, this does not mean 
that essentialism must be abandoned.
 As Edward W. Said notes, ?universality means taking a risk in order 
to go beyond the easy certainties provided us by our background, language, 
nationality, which so often shield us from the reality of others. It also means 
looking for and trying to uphold a single standard for human behavior 
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when it comes to such matters as foreign and social policy.??? Not regarding 
universalism itself as the origin of evil, Said considers the potentiality of what 
sort of universalism would be justified. For Said, universality does not signify 
a straightforwardly naïve or dogmatic idea; rather, it is avoidable by taking 
a risk that goes beyond certainties. In tracking what Said states, we can also 
examine what sort of essentialism would be justified, and I think, the other 
as transcendence will provide a clue to aid the answering of this question. 
That is, it is in the possibility of the subaltern that essentialism becomes 
aware of the risk in itself. The omnipotence of thought of the self should be 
regarded as a treacherous presupposition. With regard to this, the possibility 
of the subaltern should be upheld as a possibility such that we can always 
be ready to explain, correct, and recant the affirmative claim that seemed 
to be unquestionable at first. In addition, we can apologize for insisting on 
inaccuracy; as Spivak suggests, ?the possibility of subalternity for me acts as a 
reminder.??? In other words, the possibility of the subaltern assures the self of 
the awareness as regards misunderstandability, and as a consequence, the self 
recognizes the need for imagining itself, always shouldering the sense of risk. 
It is through a domineering egocentricity that the sense of risk is cauterized, 
resulting in essentialism falling into oppressive dogmatism based on the teeth 
of repression.
 Importantly, on the one hand, the claim that ?the other is a variant of 
the self? draws on dogmatism and egocentrism that irrationally discriminate 
and oppress the voiceless in society. However, on the other hand, this claim 
has supported the expansion of the sense of membership that assures the 
building of a society that is based on the respect of fundamental human rights. 
?uite simply, the awareness of the membership of humanity guarantees that 
anyone can possess human rights as far as they are human beings, and this 
awareness is cultivated by the proposition that ?the other is also [a] human 
being as well as the self.? Modern society has actually set a project of the 
universal evolvement of freedom in motion on this presupposition. That is, 
instead of embracing the power of religion and the authority of the church, 
they decided to create rules and a foundation by ?language? for building a new 
society in which anyone can be respected as a human being. With regard to 
this, the other should be regarded as a variant of the self, and the essence of 
freedom should be defended at least for the sake of basic civil liberties even 
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though we need to recognize the risk of the logic of modernity. Essentialism 
will contribute to defend the universal normative ethics in society. As Said 
claims, ?all human beings are entitled to expect decent standards of behavior 
concerning freedom and justice from worldly powers or nations, and that 
deliberate or inadvertent violations of these standards need to be testified 
and fought against courageously.??? Therefore, essentialism cannot be easily 
superseded by the ethics that the dimension of infinity is conducive to. 
 By encountering the transcendent other, imagination has been faced 
with its own envelope at least once, and essentialism seems to have collapsed 
in parallel. However, we should resume the essentialist perspective in the 
light of the subaltern in order to strive against relativism, in which the basis 
for ethics is lost. Two vectors of imagination: imagination directed towards 
the other and to the self, generate the possibility of modifying the schema 
of essentialism. Examining the beliefs given to the self and becoming aware 
of the risk of essentialism, the self, notwithstanding, makes an attempt to 
imagine the situation of the other. In that case, ?Imagine thyself? can be a 
guidepost for essentialism. ?Imagine thyself? is different than the maxim 
?Know thyself? in that it requires us to question anew the idea of self-
knowledge, of which Foucault and Deleuze are devoid. As Spivak points out, 
?when you seem to have solved a problem, that victory, that solution, is a 
warning,??? Thus, we do not forget that the subaltern always exists outside the 
horizon of understanding. However, at the same time, we do not abandon the 
potentiality of essentialism that provides the basis for universal civil liberties. 
6．Conclusion
 Essentialism requires two vectors of imagination in order to avoid 
dogmatism. Indeed, the eidetic enterprise exists as the continual project ad 
infinitum, and we cannot fix what is identical to something in an absolute 
manner ?insofar as all human beings are mortal?. At every moment, future 
generations come into the world, and they create new possibilities. In this 
sense, the essence always entails the undeterminable horizon, which opens 
essentialism to continual intersubjective confirmation. What should be noted 
is that the undeterminability of the essence does not signify the impossibility 
of essentialism. Instead, we learn that essentialism can serve as the logic of 
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the strongest according to circumstances. I would also like to add that the aim 
of essentialism is not only to create a common understanding beyond socio-
cultural differences but also to understand the differences among people, 
cultures, societies, religions, and communities. This is because what it is stands 
out in comparison with what it is not. The game-ness of essentialism ?that 
is, universal and essential debate in order to create the meaning and value of 
society? ought to be preserved.
 If human conditions such as mortality or the desire for freedom 
changes for any reason, essential structures and moments of the object will be 
inevitably transmuted. The important thing is not to certify that the essence 
factually exists in or beyond the world but to examine whether we really 
require a common understanding. If we do not need essences, we do not need 
essentialism either. In order to defend human rights as a universal condition 
for all human beings or to realize coexistence instead of zero-sum competition, 
we require essential thinking, which provides the intersubjective conditions for 
consensus and rules?the last bastion of the ethical. 
 The direction of imagination toward the self provides the sense of 
risk in essentialism and the possibility of avoiding dogmatic and oppressive 
mechanisms that have been problematized by Levinas and Spivak. Modified 
essentialism excludes ?absolute? essences as substantial entities; however, I 
would like to stress that the conception of the essence is to be defended in 
correlation to its aims.
 One of the limitations of this study is that only the potentiality of 
essentialism in terms of two vectors of imagination is presented, and the 
specific discussion of essentialism concerning freedom, equality, human rights, 
and social justice has not been reviewed. Indeed, a concrete regional ontology 
of such fields is required to prove the true significance of essentialism. 
Moreover, this study has not examined the method of essentialism in 
particular. On this point, I have already examined the procedure of the eidetic 
method in phenomenological essentialism in several papers even though 
there is still plenty of room for improvement. Despite these limitations, I am 
still sure that the outcome of the present study will be of some use to further 
research on essentialism and further studies on the relationship between the 
eidetic doctrine and the theory of value.
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